

## Message Text

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ORIGIN NEA-09

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SS-15 SSO-00 ISO-00 PRS-01 H-02 EUR-12

IO-10 AF-06 NSC-05 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00

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DRAFTED BY NEA/P:GFSHERMAN  
APPROVED BY NEA/P:GFSHERMAN  
S/PRS - MR. FUNSETH (INFO)  
H - MISS FOLGER (INFO)  
EUR/P - MR. JERABEK  
IO/P - MR. BLACHLY  
NEA/ARN - MR. KORN  
AF/P - MRS. RUSSELL  
NEA - MR. SOBER  
S/S -REWOODS

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TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA  
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AMEMBASSY RABAT  
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
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TOSEC 040

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, SA

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING

JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS  
FROM DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S PRESS BRIEFING FEBRUARY 10, 1975:

QUOTE: I WOULD LIKE TO ASK ABOUT THE CONTRACT WITH VINNELL.  
WE WERE TOLD AT THE PENTAGON, TO CHECK WITH STATE AND THAT  
YOU HAD A LOT MORE ON THE CONTRACT THAN WHAT THEY WERE SAY-  
ING ABOUT -- I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE "LOT MORE" IS.

A. I DON'T KNOW WHAT "THEY" SAID, OR WHAT THE DEFINITION OF  
"A LOT MORE" IS -- I HAVE BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THAT CONTRACT.

WE DO HAVE A NUMBER OF PROGRAMS IN THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY  
FIELDS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR LONG-STANDING POLICY OF  
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COOPERATION WITH AND SUPPORT FOR SAUDI ARABIA.

ONE SUCH PROGRAM IS THE MODERNIZATION OF THE SAUDI NATIONAL  
NATIONAL GUARD, BASED ON AN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN  
US IN MARCH, 1973. AS YOU KNOW, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT  
FREQUENTLY CONTRACTS WITH CIVILIAN COMPANIES TO CARRY OUT  
ASPECTS OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER SUCH PROGRAMS. IN  
THIS INSTANCE, THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND, WHICH HAS RESPON-  
SIBILITY FOR SUPERVISING THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD MODERNI-  
ZATION PROGRAM, AWARDED A CONTRACT TO THE VINNELL CORPORA-  
TION OF LOS ANGELES, TO PERFORM TRAINING AND SOME LOGISTIC  
SERVICES. THE CONTRACT WAS ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY, JANUARY  
8TH.

Q. ON WHAT DAY?

A. JANUARY 8TH.

THE VINNELL IS ONE OF SEVERAL COMPANIES INVOLVED IN THIS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WHICH COVERS A PERIOD OF NEARLY SIX YEARS, AND WHICH IS BEING FULLY FUNDED BY THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT.

THIS WHOLE OPERATION IS UNDER THE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF THE U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND. NO AMERICAN CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL, OR U.S. MILITARY, ARE INVOLVED IN THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD CHAIN OF COMMAND. THE U.S. HAS IN THE PAST USED CONTRACTOR SERVICES TO TRAIN SAUDI AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE USE OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

FOR EXAMPLE: RAYTHEON CORPORATION HAS INSTRUCTED THE SAUDIS IN THE USE OF HAWK ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES. NORTHROP HAS DONE TRAINING FOR THE SAUDIS IN FLYING THE F-5 AIRCRAFT.

Q. SO FAR, YOU HAVE JUST REPEATED WHAT WE WERE TOLD AT THE PENTAGON. BUT THESE ARE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS BUILT BY THESE COMPANIES. IS THIS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS EVER CONTRACTED WITH A FOREIGN COUNTRY THROUGH A CIVILIAN CORPORATION, TO TRAIN TROOPS?

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A. I CANNOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION SPECIFICALLY.

I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THIS IS THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD, AND THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD IS CONCERNED, AND IS BEING TRAINED FOR DOMESTIC SECURITY.

Q. CAN YOU TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THE CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THAT? WHO THEY REPORT TO, AND SO ON? I BELIEVE THE SAUDIS MAINTAIN A RIGIDLY SEPARATED MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM SO THAT THE ARMY, THE NATIONAL GUARD AND SO ON, ARE

ALL -- ALL HAVE SEPARATE CHAINS OF COMMAND AND SO ON -- ALL REPORT TO THE SAME --

A. I UNDERSTAND THAT IS THE CASE, BUT I DO NOT HAVE THAT KIND OF INFORMATION ON THIS ORGANIZATION.

Q. BUT WHAT I AM GETTING AT IS: HOW WOULD THE ASSIGNMENT OF THIS CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATION DIFFER FROM THAT OF THE MAAG THAT WE HAVE IN SAUDI ARABIA -- AND HAVE HAD FOR YEARS? THEY ARE INVOLVED IN TRAINING TOO, AREN'T THEY?

A. WELL, ON BACKGROUND, I THINK THAT WHAT THIS COMPANY

IS PREPARING IS SIMILAR TO THE KIND OF TRAINING AND FUNCTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PERFORMED BY MAAG'S. PERMIT ME TO PROVIDE YOU SOME MORE INFORMATION BY WAY OF BACKGROUND.

Q. DID YOU SAY, "ON BACKGROUND?"

A. NO, YOU CAN QUOTE ME ON THIS.

THERE WAS A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, IN MARCH, 1973, IN WHICH WE AGREED TO HELP THE SAUDIS MODERNIZE UNITS OF THEIR NATIONAL GUARD. WE DISCUSSED THIS AGREEMENT WITH THE CONGRESS AT THAT TIME.

Q. WITH WHOM?

A. WITH THE CONGRESS, WITH THE HOUSE AND SENATE FOREIGN UNCLASSIFIED

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AFFAIRS AND RELATIONS COMMITTEES.

THE APPROVED PROGRAM INVOLVED THE CONSTRUCTION OF HEAD-QUARTERS, MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY AND TRAINING FACILITIES, ESTABLISHING A LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, MODERNIZATION OF EQUIPMENT, TRAINING FOUR MECHANIZED BATTALIONS, AND ONE ARTILLERY BATTALION, IN THE USE AND MAINTENANCE OF THE NEW EQUIPMENT.

THE PORTION OF THE PROGRAM THAT I HAVE JUST OUTLINED WHICH THE VINNELL CORPORATION IS INVOLVED IN, IS THE TRAINING OF THE FOUR MECHANIZED BATTALIONS.

IN APRIL, 1973, THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND WAS GIVEN OVER-ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM -- A PROJECT MANAGER WAS APPOINTED, AND AN OFFICE ESTABLISHED IN RIYADH, STAFFED BY ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND PERSONNEL, TO DEVELOP A SALES CASE AND GET CONTRACT PROCEDURES STARTED.

Q. TO DEVELOP A "SALES -- ?"

A. "CASE." PROPOSAL. AND GET THE CONTRACT PROCEDURES STARTED.

IN APRIL, 1974, THE MASTER SALES "CASE" AS ITS WRITTEN HERE, WAS APPROVED AND ACCEPTED. IT WAS APPROVED IN APRIL OF '74 AND IT WAS ACCEPTED ON JULY 1ST, 1974. THE PROGRAM IS EXPECTED TO LAST ALMOST SIX YEARS.

AS IT STANDS NOW, THE PROGRAM, OVERALL COST, IS IN EXCESS OF \$300 MILLION.

THE VINNELL CORPORATION IS ONE OF SEVERAL COMPANIES INVOLV-

ED IN THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. ITS CONTRACT IS WITH THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND AND WAS ANNOUNCED AS I INDICATED EARLIER, ON JANUARY 8TH.

THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, ITSELF, ALSO INVOLVES SUCH THINGS AS FOREIGN MILITARY SALES, PURCHASES OF ARMORED CARS, LIGHT HOWITZERS, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.

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THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PLANNING, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE HEADQUARTERS FACILITIES AND FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CRITERIA FOR THE VEHICLE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM.

Q. WHAT IS THE COST OF THE CONTRACT WITH THE VINNELL CORPORATION AND WHAT ARE THE OTHER COMPANIES AND THEIR SHARE OF THE CONTRACT?

A. I DON'T HAVE THE COST OF THE VINNELL CORPORATION CONTRACT. I'LL LOOK INTO THAT.

AND I DON'T HAVE INFORMATION ON OTHER CONTRACTS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN SIGNED, OTHER THAN WHAT I HAVE STATED.

Q. THE \$300 (MILLION) IS THE OVERALL COST?

A. THE WHOLE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

Q. BUT THAT DOESN'T INCLUDE THE ARMORED VEHICLES, DOES IT?

A. NO. WELL, THE VINNELL PORTION, WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION, IS THEIR TRAINING OF THE FOUR MECHANIZED BATTALIONS.

Q. NO, BUT EXCUSE ME -- THEN WE ARE STILL LOST THEN AS TO WHAT THE PERCENTAGE IS, THEN, OF WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE, AS IT DOESN'T INCLUDE THE ARMORED CARS AND HOWITZERS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT.

A. I'LL JUST HAVE TO TAKE THAT QUESTION.

Q. WHAT DOES THE \$300 INCLUDE?

A. WELL, THE GUIDANCE WE HAVE IS THAT THE OVERALL PROGRAM, THE OVERALL MODERNIZATION PROGRAM -- AT PRESENT ESTIMATES, THE COST IS IN EXCESS OF \$300 MILLION.

Q. AND THAT IS EXCLUDING THE HARDWARE. IS THAT CORRECT?

A. YES.

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FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS SUPPLIED LATER TO CORRESPONDENTS: THE FIGURE IN EXCESS OF \$300 MILLION DOES INCLUDE THE WEAPONS. SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 1/4 OF THE OVERALL COST IS ESTIMATED TO BE EQUIPMENT.

Q. WHEN YOU HAVE -- SAY THE PRIVATE CONTRACTORS GET PAID, WHICH IS FINE -- AND THE HARDWARE WE SELL TO THEM, I PRESUME, BECAUSE THERE'S LOTS OF MONEY IN THAT -- BUT WHAT ABOUT THE WORK BEING DONE, OR TO BE DONE, BY THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS? IS THAT A GIFT? OR IS THAT REIMBURSED?

A. I'LL HAVE TO CHECK ON THAT, BUT I THINK I SAID BEFORE, THAT THE WHOLE PROGRAM IS BEING FUNDED ENTIRELY BY THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT.

Q. YES, BUT SOMETIMES THESE THINGS -- WHERE WE HAVE EXISTING ARMY FACILITIES AND PEOPLE -- THE PEOPLE SORT OF "GET THROWN IN FOR FREE."

A. I'LL CHECK THAT.

Q. AND I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A CHECK.

A. I'LL TAKE THAT QUESTION.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS LATER SUPPLIED TO CORRESPONDENTS: THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT IS FUNDING THE WHOLE PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FOR THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON WHAT OTHER WEAPONS ARE INVOLVED BECAUSE THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY WOULD USE MORE THAN WHAT'S LISTED -- ARMORED CARS AND LIGHT HOWITZERS -- MORTARS --

A. I HAVE SAID, "ARMORED CARS, LIGHT HOWITZERS, AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT."

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Q. SORRY.

A. AND THAT'S FOR THE USE OF THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD.

Q. ANY OTHER WEAPONS OR EQUIPMENT THAT SHOULD BE LISTED?

A. WELL, I'LL CHECK INTO THAT ALSO.

Q. DO YOU KNOW THE SIZE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD?

A. I BELIEVE THAT INFORMATION SHOULD COME FROM THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT.

Q. WOULD YOU EXPLAIN NOW WHY THE VINNELL CORPORATION IS QUALIFIED TO DO THIS JOB.

A. WOULD YOU REPEAT YOUR QUESTION?

Q. WHY THE VINNELL CORPORATION IS QUALIFIED TO TRAIN FOUR MECHANIZED BATTALIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA. I JUST TAKE IT IT'S A PRIVATE CORPORATION AND HOW CAN A PRIVATE CORPORATION DO THAT?

A. WELL I DON'T SEE WHY THEY CAN'T DO IT.

Q. WELL IT REQUIRES, I WOULD SAY, IT REQUIRES MILITARY EXPERIENCE -- I WOULD THINK -- I JUST TAKE IT THAT IT'S A PRIVATE CORPORATION.

A. WELL I DON'T KNOW. THE NATIONAL GUARD IS BEING TRAINED FOR DOMESTIC SECURITY PURPOSES. I DON'T THINK IT'S SO SURPRISING, OR UNPRECEDENTED THAT THEY WOULD BE TRAINED BY A PRIVATE CONTRACTOR.

Q. TWO SENATORS ARE ASKING FOR A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION. IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT AGREEABLE TO PARTICIPATE?

A. I AM NOT AWARE OF THAT SPECIFIC REQUEST, BUT WE ARE ALWAYS COOPERATIVE WITH THE SENATE WHEN THEY ARE EXAMINING VARIOUS PROGRAMS THAT WE ENGAGE IN.

Q  
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I WONDER ABOUT THE TIMING OF THIS -- THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WAS IN APRIL OF '73.

A. MARCH, 1973.

Q. MARCH OF '73 -- SORRY. DIDN'T THE FIRST PUBLIC

INDICATION FROM HERE, FROM THIS BUILDING, OF A LARGE SCALE MODERNIZATION OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN ARMED FORCES, BECOME EVIDENT EITHER IN APRIL, MAY, OR JUNE OF '74? IS THAT A SEPARATE PROGRAM?

A. YES, THIS IS SEPARATE. THIS PROGRAM, HERE, IS NOT PART OF THAT OTHER -- DEFENSE SURVEY.

Q. SO THIS WOULD BE "IN ADDITION TO" THE DEFENSE SURVEY?

A. YES, SEPARATE.

Q. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK A QUESTION ON -- I GUESS "PROTOCOL" WHEN THEY MADE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT TO VINNELL CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF \$76.9 MILLION, ON JANUARY 7TH, THERE WAS NO MENTION WHATEVER, OF WHERE THIS WAS GOING, OR WHAT IT WAS GOING TO DO. IT JUST SAID, THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND ISSUED THIS CONTRACT FOR \$76.9 MILLION -- THAT VINNELL WOULD SUPPLY PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL OVERSEAS.

AND THEN WHEN WE ASKED ABOUT THAT, THEY SAID THAT "THIS IS AT THE REQUEST OF THE SAUDIS" THAT THE REQUESTING GOVERNMENT ON THE CONTRACT SAYS: "KEEP IT SECRET. DON'T LET IT OUT WHAT THAT IS GOING TO BE." IS THAT NORMAL PROTOCOL?

A. I DON'T KNOW THE HISTORY THAT YOU HAVE JUST RELATED BEFORE. I HAVE THE INFORMATION THAT I HAVE PROVIDED YOU. NORMALLY, WE DO RESPECT WISHES OF OTHER COUNTRIES CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN PRACTICES.

Q. DID THE SAUDIS ASK THAT THIS BE KEPT SECRET?

A. I DON'T KNOW THAT.

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Q. THE FACT THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD HAD TO BE MODERNIZED, WAS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN TWO YEARS AGO -- WRITTEN IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND OTHER PAPERS.

Q. YES, BUT WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT IS SPECIFICALLY THE CIVILIAN FIRM -- WE HAVE NEVER KNOWN THAT A CIVILIAN FIRM HAS BEEN CONTRACTED FOR, BEFORE, TOTRAIN TROOPS -- NATIONAL GUARD, OGHREGQLAR ARMY.

A. WELL, AGAIN, I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT AN ARMY. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A DOMESTIC SECURITY ORGANIZATION, THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD.

Q. HOW LARGE IS THE MAAG THERE IN SAUDI ARABIA?

A. I DON'T KNOW. I'LL LOOK INTO THAT.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS SUPPLIED LATER: THE MAAG IS ABOUT 130 U.S. PERSONNEL.

Q. THE UNITED STATES IS ALSO MODERNIZING THE KOREAN ARMED FORCES UNDER A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM. ARE THERE ANY PRIVATE CONTRACTORS ON THAT?

A. I DON'T KNOW.



Q. WILL YOU TAKE THAT QUESTION?

A. YES, I WILL.

Q. WHY COULDN'T MAAG HAVE DONE THIS?

A. I DON'T KNOW THE REASON WHY THE MAAG COULDN'T HAVE DONE IT, BUT OBVIOUSLY IN DEVELOPING THIS PROGRAM WITH THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THIS WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO CARRY OUT THE GOALS OF THE PROGRAM.

Q. COULD YOU DISCUSS, SIR, WHAT THE DOMESTIC SECURITY PROBLEM IN SAUDI ARABIA IS, AND WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS VITAL INTERESTS INVOLVED IN THAT SECURITY PROBLEM?

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A. I DON'T THINK THAT WE NORMALLY GET INTO DISCUSSING OR DEFINING WHAT THE DOMESTIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ARE OF COUNTRIES WITH WHOM WE ENTER INTO THESE KIND OF UNDERSTANDINGS.

Q. THIS INVOLVES AMERICAN MONEY AND AMERICAN PEOPLE.

A. WELL, AS I TOLD YOU BEFORE, IN MARCH OF 1973 THIS PROGRAM WAS DISCUSSED FULLY WITH THE CONGRESS.

Q. DID CONGRESS VOTE ON IT?

A. NO, THERE WAS NO VOTE AS FAR AS I KNOW IN THE CONGRESS. AND THERE NORMALLY ISN'T IN THESE KINDS OF CONSULTATIONS.

Q. AMERICAN FUNDS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS, EVEN THOUGH THEY WILL BE REPAID.

A. BUT IN THE BEGINNING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, OR WHEN THE QUESTION FIRST STARTED, I THOUGHT I SAID VERY CLEARLY THAT THIS PROGRAM WAS BEING FULLY FUNDED BY THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT. I DON'T UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION.

Q. BUT IT INVOLVES AN EXPENDITURE OF AMERICAN MONEY IN SOME FASHION, BECAUSE THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND IS INVOLVED. THEY WOULDN'T DO IT FOR NOTHING. IT COSTS MONEY TO OPERATE THAT COMMAND, AND THE PROGRAM MUST INVOLVE AMERICAN FUNDS.

A. WELL, I WILL CHECK INTO THAT POINT.

SEE PREVIOUS INFORMATION ABOUT SAUDI ARABIANS FUNDING OF ALL COSTS.

Q. THAT WAS THE REASON FOR MY QUESTION ON THE US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, THE SAME REASON.

A. THAT WAS THE SAME QUESTION MR. HENSLEY ASKED.

Q. YOU SEEMED TO STRESS THAT NO VINNELL PERSONNEL NOR U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE INVOLVED IN THE SAUDI NATIONAL UNCLASSIFIED

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GUARD CHAIN OF COMMAND. ARE THERE OTHER AMERICAN GOVERNMENT -- NONGOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN THIS THING THAT YOU ARE HIRING NOW.

A. NO, NOT THAT I AM AWARE OF.

Q. WHY DID THE UNITED STATES AGREE TO DO THIS?

A. WELL, I DON'T HAVE THE HISTORY OF IT, BUT I ASSUME THAT THERE WERE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SAUDI AND OUR AUTHORITIES ON THE QUESTION OF THE CAPABILITY OF THE SAUDIS TO DEAL WITH THEIR DOMESTIC SECURITY PROBLEM AND THAT AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, THIS KIND OF A PLAN WAS DEVELOPED AND AGREED TO.

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHO INITIATED THOSE DISCUSSIONS?

A. I DON'T KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHO INITIATED THE DISCUSSIONS.

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHETHER AT ANY TIME DURING THE EMBARGO, OR AT ANY TIME IN THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN-ARAB RELATIONS AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF THE OIL EMBARGO AND OIL PRICES, THAT THERE WAS ANY CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO WITHHOLDING THIS PROGRAM OR CHANGING IT OR USING THIS AS AN ELEMENT OF LEVERAGE AGAINST THE SAUDIS?

A. NO, I DON'T.

Q. YOU DON'T, BUT YOU DON'T KNOW THAT THAT MIGHT NOT HAVE HAPPENED?

A. I DON'T THINK I REALLY CAN COMMENT ON THAT.

Q. WHY IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCING A PROGRAM, OR DISCUSSING OR DESCRIBING A PROGRAM, WHICH IS BEING OPERATED BY THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND AND THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS?

A. WELL, I THINK IT PROBABLY COMES UNDER THE GENERAL TOPIC OF OUR LONG-STANDING POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH AND SUPPORT FOR SAUDI ARABIA, BOTH IN ECONOMICS AND SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED

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FIELDS.

Q. ARE THERE ANY STRINGS ON AMERICAN TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS THE STRING THAT WE PUT ON THE RESALE OF ARMAMENTS? DOES THIS MEAN THAT THESE FOUR BATTALIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, CAN BE USED OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY, AS THEY SO DESIRE, OR WOULD WE HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT THAT?

A. I AM NOT AN EXPERT, A MILITARY EXPERT, OR PRESUME TO BE ONE, ON THE DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS OF AN ARMY AS OPPOSED TO A NATIONAL GUARD UNIT THAT IS BEING TRAINED FOR DOMESTIC SECURITY. BUT IT WOULD SEEM THAT BY DEFINITION THAT THAT IS WHAT IT IS BEING TRAINED FOR.

Q. FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES.

A. YES.

Q. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES OR SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS WITH ANY OF THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES NOW?

A. NO, I DON'T.

Q. YOU DON'T KNOW, OR YOU DON'T KNOW IF THEY EXIST?

A. I DON'T KNOW IF THEY EXIST.

Q. ARE THERE ANY SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS WITH ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD, OR IS THIS AN ENTIRELY NEW PATTERN? THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE THE ESSENCE OF THE QUESTIONING THAT YOU ARE EXPERIENCING HERE?

A. WELL, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THERE IS A SPECIFIC PARALLEL TO THIS PARTICULAR CONTRACT, BUT WE HAVE USED CONTRACTOR SERVICES TO TRAIN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE USE OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT. AND OBVIOUSLY THAT IS WHAT IS INVOLVED IN TRAINING THESE FOUR MECHANIZED BATTALIONS.

Q. WOULD YOU GIVE US SOME EXAMPLE OF THAT?  
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AM OF ANOTHER COUNTRY?

Q. YES, PLEASE.

A. I WILL TAKE THAT QUESTION.

Q. JUST TO WIND UP THIS SAUDI ARABIAN THING, I THINK YOU

SAID AT ONE TIME THE REASON WHY THESE THINGS ARE NOT ANNOUNCED UNTIL LATER, OR SO FORTH, IS THE REQUEST OF THE SAUDIS.

A. THAT WAS IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION SOMEONE ASKED, IF I THOUGHT THAT WAS THE REASON WHY--A QUESTION IN THE BACK OF THE ROOM--IS THIS NORMAL PROTOCOL THAT THE TWO PARTIES TO AN AGREEMENT AGREE ON PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

Q. AND YOUR ANSWER WAS WHAT?

A. I THOUGHT IT WAS.

Q. WELL, THEN, YOU WOULD BE UNABLE TO SAY WHETHER THERE ARE ANY OTHERS OF THESE, OR HOW MANY THERE MIGHT BE. THERE MIGHT BE A NUMBER WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED.

A. WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

Q. WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

A. I DON'T KNOW OF ANY.

Q. ANOTHER POINT ON WHICH I AM UNCLEAR IS WHAT KIND OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROL IS THERE ON THIS KIND OF ARRANGEMENT OVERSEAS BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. YOU SAY THAT THE FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES WERE CONSULTED. BUT WAS THIS MERELY INFORMING THEM OF AN AGREEMENT? DOES THIS SHOW IN THE BUDGET ANYWHERE?

A. I DON'T BELIEVE IT IS SHOWN IN THE BUDGET BECAUSE IT IS FULLY FUNDED BY THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT. AND WHAT WE SAID WAS "CONSULTATION." WE CONSULTED WITH THE TWO UNCLASSIFIED

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COMMITTEES.

Q. I'D LIKE TO ASK A QUESTION ABOUT THE STORY THAT CAME OUT FROM LOS ANGELES YESTERDAY. IT SAID THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD WOULD BE USED TO PROTECT THE OIL FIELDS OF SAUDI ARABIA. AND I AM TRYING TO DETERMINE WHAT IS THE THREAT OR THE KNOWN THREAT TO THE OIL FIELDS OF SAUDI ARABI.

ANYTHING THAT HAS SUDDENLY ARISEN.

A. WELL, THAT GOES BACK TO THE OTHER QUESTION YOU ASKED ABOUT WHAT WERE THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT, AND MY RESPONSE TO THAT PREVIOUS QUESTION APPLIES TO THIS QUESTION.

Q. YOU STRESSED THAT THE ROLE OF THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD IS STRICTLY DOMESTIC SECURITY. THIS IMPLIB THAT YOU

REGARD THE ROLE OF THE OTHER SAUDI FORCE IS EXTERNAL OFFENSIVE.

A. I DON'T ACCEPT THAT LINE OF REASONING.

Q. WELL, YOU LEFT ME WITH THAT IMPLICATION.

A. WELL, THAT CERTAINLY IS NOT TO BE IMPLIED FROM WHAT I HAVE SAID.

Q. CAN YOU ITEMIZE WHAT YOU MEAN WHEN YOU SAY THE NATIONAL GUARD WOULD BE INVOLVED IN DOMESTIC SECURITY? DOES THAT INCLUDE THE REFERENCE MADE BY PETER ARNETT IN A STORY TO PROTECTING OIL FIELDS AS WELL?

A. WELL, THAT QUESTION WAS ASKED IN TWO DIFFERENT WAYS EARLIER, AND I AM NOT GOING TO, FROM HERE, AS SPOKESMAN, ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE DOMESTIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT.

Q. WELL, WHAT ARE THEY? I MEAN, YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT DETAILS, WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN US ONLY IN RESPONSE TO A NEWS REPORT, AND IT IS A TERRIBLY AMBIGUOUS STATEMENT ABOUT DOMESTIC NEEDS. IT SEEMS TO ME THERE OUGHT TO BE SOME UNCLASSIFIED

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SPECIFICITY THAT GOES WITH IT.

A. WELL, I AM NOT AWARE OF OUR ENGAGING IN DETAILED DISCUSSIONS, OR ENGAGING IN THE SPECIFICS THAT YOU ARE SEEKING FROM ME WHEN WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE DOMESTIC SECURITY OR THE NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

Q. BUT DIDN'T THAT COME UP IN THE CONVERSATIONS WITH THIS GOVERNMENT WHEN THIS WHOLE THING WAS BEING EXPLORED?

A. I AM SURE IN THE EVALUATION OF ANY PROGRAM, WHETHER IT IS FOR DOMESTIC SECURITY OR NATIONAL SECURITY, THAT THERE IS A MUTUAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR REASON FOR NOT GIVING US THIS INFORMATION?

A. THE REASON IS THE PRACTICE WHICH I HAVE RESTATED HERE, THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHETHER THE VINNELL CORPORATION OR THE RETIRED AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL BE INVOLVED -- WILL HAVE TO REGISTER AS FOREIGN AGENTS?

A. I DON'T KNOW THAT, AND I DON'T SEE WHY THEY SHOULD

REGISTER AS FOREIGN AGENTS. THEY ARE WORKING FOR AN AMERICAN COMPANY AS A TECHNICAL ADVISER.

Q. BUT YOU SAID THAT IT IS ENTIRELY A FULL-FUNDED OPERATION OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT, THEREFORE THE VINNELL CORPORATION WOULD BE WORKING DIRECTLY FOR THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT.

A. WHY DOES THAT HAVE TO DO WITH THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT?

Q. THEY ARE ACTING ON BEHALF OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

A. THERE IS A CONTRACT UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND. ON BACKGROUND, I DON'T FOLLOW YOUR UNCLASSIFIED

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QUESTIONING. THERE ARE AMERICAN CIVILIANS ENGAGED IN PROGRAMS OF PROVIDING TECHNICAL ADVICE, TRAINING PERHAPS NOT FOR NATIONAL GUARD, BUT FOR OTHER PEOPLE, AND THEY CERTAINLY DON'T REGISTER AS FOREIGN AGENTS. END QUOTE. INGERSOLL

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PRESS CONFERENCES, TOSEC 036  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 11 FEB 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STATE030404  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** NEA/P:GFSHERMAN  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D750048-0813  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750287/baaaagqg.tel  
**Line Count:** 729  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN NEA  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 14  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** CunninFX  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:** ANOMALY  
**Review Date:** 28 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <28 APR 2003 by BrownAM>; APPROVED <15 JAN 2004 by CunninFX>  
**Review Markings:**

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US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PFOR, SA  
**To:** JERUSALEM  
JIDDA  
TEL AVIV  
AMMAN  
BEIRUT  
CAIRO

DAMASCUS  
GENEVA  
KUWAIT  
DHAHRAN  
KHARTOUM  
MANAMA  
TUNIS  
TRIPOLI  
RABAT  
LONDON  
PARIS  
MOSCOW  
ROME  
USUN NY  
NATO  
SANAA  
BAGHDAD  
DOHA  
ABU DHABI  
ALGIERS  
DUBLIN  
TEHRAN  
CINCEUR  
**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006